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ABSTRACT
In recent years an increasing number of studies have examined anxiety-related metacognitive
beliefs and their relationship to anxiety disorder diagnoses and treatment outcome. However, no
study to date has examined changes in metacognitive beliefs following induced anxiety. The aim
of the present study is to examine the relationship between changes in state anxiety and worryrelated metacognitive beliefs. Participants completed baseline measures of anxiety and
metacognitions before either being exposed to a control stimulus or worry-inducing stimulus.
Following exposure participants completed anxiety and metacognition measures once again.
Group means comparison analyses and correlations are reported. Results suggest state anxiety
can be negatively influenced by a brief, worrisome exposure. Inconclusive results about changes
in anxiety and metacognitions, limitations of the present study, and implications for future
research are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION

Metacognitive theory (Wells, 1995, 1999) posits that negative appraisals of one’s own
thoughts (i.e., metacognition; Flavell, 1979) and worry play a significant role in the etiology and
maintenance of anxiety disorders such as generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). According to
Wells’ (1995, 1999) metacognitive model of GAD, over time with exposure to anxiety-inducing
events individuals develop two types of beliefs related to worrying. Type 1 worry (i.e., positive
beliefs about worry) is thought to comprise those dysfunctional beliefs about the utility of
worrying, such as believing that worrying allows one to be in control. Type 2 worry (i.e.,
negative beliefs about worry) is defined as those dysfunctional beliefs about the consequences of
worry, such as believing that not being able to control one’s thoughts is dangerous. The
metacognitive model poses that positive beliefs about worry heighten attention to anxietyprovoking stimuli which yields additional worry leading to negative beliefs about one’s worry.
Wells further asserts that temporary anxiety-relieving behavioral strategies such as reassurance
seeking and avoidance elicit perpetuated worry, maintaining this vicious anxiety cycle.
Dysfunctional appraisals of one’s own thoughts are believed to play a role in other anxiety
disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). In some models of OCD, beliefs about
responsibility for harm, dangerous thought control, thought-action fusion, and self-appraisal are
temporarily alleviated by compulsions, which maintain the obsession-compulsion cycle (Wells,
1997; Purdon & Clark, 1999). Although arguably behavioral therapy and cognitive behavioral
therapy (CBT) have targeted metacognitions under a different label for decades (Moritz &
Lysaker, 2018), recently anxiety-related metacognitions (especially those domains asserted by
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Wells) have been measured across treatment modalities such as metacognitive therapy (MCT)
and CBT as a form of treatment outcome.
The Metacognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) and its shortened
version, the MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) are self-report scales developed to
measure five constructs of anxiety-related metacognitions including positive beliefs about worry
(i.e., beliefs that worry is beneficially functional), negative beliefs about worry (i.e., beliefs that
worry is harmful and uncontrollable), cognitive self-consciousness (i.e., attention to one’s own
thought processes), cognitive confidence (i.e., distrust in one’s ability to remember information),
and need to control thoughts (i.e., beliefs that thoughts are one’s responsibility to control to avoid
punishment). In the development of the original MCQ, Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997)
found that all pre-post subscale scores and MCQ total scores were highly correlated, suggesting
these constructs are stable over time. Similarly, test-retest scores were found to be highly
correlated over an average of roughly 34 days, except for the negative beliefs about worry
subscale, which was moderately correlated. The authors suggest exposure to stress may
contribute to increased beliefs about the controllability of thoughts, but otherwise conclude again
the MCQ-30 measures trait-like as opposed to state-dependent qualities. “Trait anxiety” typically
describes a rather enduring tendency for an individual to assess upsetting situations as
particularly threatening, which may influence their “state anxiety,” or their severity of anxiety as
a result (Spielberger, 1983). Like other trait measures of anxiety symptomology, both the MCQ
and MCQ-30 have been utilized to assess treatment outcome.
For example, the MCQ and MCQ-30 have demonstrated sensitivity to change following
treatment effects for individual and group CBT for OCD (MCQ-30; Solem, Håland, Vogel,
Hansen, & Wells, 2009), individual inpatient MCT and CBT for a various anxiety disorders
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(MCQ-30; Johnson, Hoffart, Nordahl, Ulvenes, Vrabel, & Vampold, 2017), group MCT for
GAD (MCQ-30 positive and negative beliefs subscales; McEvoy et al., 2015), and individual
MCT and intolerance-of-uncertainty therapy for GAD (MCQ positive and negative beliefs
subscales; van der Heiden, Muris, & van der Molen, 2012). Although the MCQ-30 has been
reported as sensitive to change over the course of treatment, no studies to date have examined
changes in metacognitions following an anxiety-provoking stimulus or how those changes may
be related to changes in state anxiety.
One study (Prados, 2011) has examined beliefs about worry and the relationship between
these beliefs and changes in state anxiety following exposure to an anxiety-provoking stimulus.
In the first experiment, participants were exposed to a potentially anxiety-provoking stimulus in
order to examine the effects of different types of persuasion about the utility of worry on changes
in state anxiety and worry about the stimulus. The potentially worrisome stimulus in this first
experiment was a narrative regarding the disappearance of an Amazonian culture, “an absolutely
new worrisome message for the [Spanish undergraduate students]” (p. 218, Prados, 2011) in
order to control for habituation per Parkinson and Rachman (1980). Worry was measured by a
single question asking participants how worried they were about the stimulus (1 – not at all to 7 –
very much) after exposure (but not before), and no significant differences between groups were
observed. Further, across groups, participants indicated only a moderate level of worry (M = 4.3,
SD = 1.17; Prados, 2011), which may have been the result of social desirability as the author
concludes. Meanwhile, significantly higher state anxiety scores (STAI-S; Spielberger, 1983)
were reported after exposure. In the second experiment, a more individually meaningful anxietyprovoking stimulus was implemented, but again no significant differences were found across
groups for stimulus-specific worry. However, significantly increased state anxiety scores were
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observed following exposure, indicating brief exposure to a consequential worry is effective at
inducing state anxiety. The primary aim of this study was to examine the effects of persuasion on
beliefs about worry. As such, all participants were exposed to the same anxiety-provoking
scenario. Additionally, neither the MCQ or MCQ-30 were utilized, and changes in the anxietyrelated metacognitions posited to maintain generalized worry as measured by the similar
Consequences of Worry Scale (COWS; Davey, Tallis, & Capuzzo, 1996) were not measured.
Therefore, the question remains as to whether changes in state anxiety are related to changes in
metacognitions following exposure to an anxiety-provoking stimulus.
The present study has two primary aims. The first of these is to examine the effectiveness
of a degree-requirement-change narrative and writing exercise for inducing anxiety amongst
undergraduate students. Additionally, this study seeks to investigate the relationship between
changes in state anxiety and relevant metacognitions as measured by the MCQ-30 following
exposure to an anxiety-provoking stimulus. It was first hypothesized that neither group would
demonstrate significant differences on trait anxiety (STAI-T), state anxiety (STAI-S), or
metacognitions (MCQ-30) total scores prior to randomization into groups. Consistent with
previous research (e.g., Prados, 2011) it was then hypothesized students presented with a brief,
personally concerning scenario (i.e., degree requirement changes) would report significantly
increased state anxiety while students presented with a control scenario would report no change
in state anxiety. Following exposure, students in the experimental condition were also
hypothesized to report significantly increased MCQ-30 total scores from baseline and compared
to students in the control condition. Because the metacognitive model suggests positive beliefs
about worry are triggered with stress, students in the experimental condition were additionally
expected to report significantly increased positive beliefs subscale scores following exposure to
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the scenario and writing exercise. Similarly, as negative beliefs about the danger and
uncontrollability of worry are thought to be stimulated as a result of worry, students in the
experimental condition were hypothesized to report significantly higher negative beliefs subscale
scores. Finally, it was hypothesized that state anxiety change scores would predict metacognition
change scores while controlling for trait anxiety.
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METHODS

Participants
Participants were 29 students at a large Midwestern university. Students participated in
the study for two hours of course-required research participation. Students qualified for inclusion
in the study if they were enrolled in an introductory psychology course, reported being at least 18
years of age, and provided informed consent. Three participants elected not to have their data
included in analyses following debriefing, leaving the final sample size at 26.
The average age of participants was 19.12 years (range: 18-22, SD = 0.95). Participants
had the ability to endorse multiple races/ethnicities, and were 84.6% (n=22) White, 7.7% (n = 2)
African-American, 3.8% (n=1) Asian, and 3.8% (n=1) Bi- or Multi-Racial. Half of the
participants were female (n = 13, 50.0%), while half were male; no participants identified as
transgender or non-binary.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions through the Qualtrics
survey system with automatic attempts at keeping each group equivalent in size. Of the 26
participants who qualified (i.e., reported being at least 18 years old), provided informed consent,
completed the survey, and agreed to have their data used, 14 (53.8%) were assigned to the
control condition while 12 (46.2%) were assigned to the experimental condition. All participants
responded appropriately to an attention check approximately halfway through the survey,
suggesting that students read questions carefully and followed instructions.
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Procedures
Students enrolled in an introductory psychology course seeking research credit as part of
their course requirements elected to participate in the study through the department’s research
participation system (SONA). Participants were directed to a web-based survey through a link to
Qualtrics, where they were initially presented with a consent form. Upon providing consent,
participants answered a series of demographic questionnaires at which time they were screened
for age qualification. They were then asked to complete each of the following measures before
being randomly assigned to either experimental or control condition. The measures and
procedures utilized in this study were approved by the Institutional Review Board on March
26th, 2019 (IRB #IRB-FY2019-588; Appendix A).
In the control condition, participants were asked to complete each of the following
measures (i.e., both state and trait anxiety forms of the STAI-AD, the entire MCQ-30). They
were then asked to carefully read information detailing the general degree requirements for
completing a baccalaureate degree at their institution. The information provided were those
degree requirements, including course credit hours and GPA scores, outlined by the university’s
registrar’s office and publicly available. These students were then asked to respond to a series of
questions relevant to their reading including how satisfied they are with the current degree
requirements and how concerned or confident they are about completing these requirements.
These statements were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (completely
dissatisfied; very concerned) to 7 (completely satisfied; very confident) with a neutral response
option. They were also asked to report how many course credit hours they are currently enrolled,
number of courses enrolled, and their intended major. Control condition participants were then
asked to spend approximately five minutes writing about the following topics: Why they chose to
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attend their school over another university, why they chose to transfer to their school from
another university (if applicable), why they chose their intended major, and why they are
currently enrolled in an introductory psychology course. These questions were intended to be
neutral, non-anxiety-provoking questions mirroring those of the experimental condition.
Participants were then tasked with completing the state-anxiety portion of the STAI-AD and the
MCQ-30 once again.
In the experimental condition, participants were asked to complete the entirety of the
STAI-AD and the MCQ-30. They were then asked to carefully read information about general
baccalaureate degree requirements at their university. These participants were told that an
internal institutional board had proposed changes to the general degree requirements to be
implemented the following semester which would affect all students who are currently enrolled.
The presented degree requirements were exactly the same as those presented in the control
condition, with the fictional proposed changes and a brief summary of the implications of each
change listed beneath the relevant requirement (e.g., “This change is anticipated to increase the
number of courses required for completion by an additional year of study”). These students were
then asked to respond to a series of questions relevant to their reading including how satisfied
they are with the proposed changes to degree requirements and how concerned or confident they
are about completing these new requirements. Again, these statements were rated on a 7-point
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied; very concerned) to 7 (completely
satisfied; very confident) with a neutral response option. They were also asked to report how
many course credit hours they are currently enrolled, number of courses enrolled, and their
intended major. Experimental condition participants were then asked to spend approximately five
minutes writing about the following topics: What concerns they may have about completing
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these additional requirements, which proposed change concerns them the most and why, how the
proposed changes may impact their educational experience, and what additional resources they
may need to complete these additional requirements. These questions were intended to be mildly
anxiety-provoking by prompting students to consider the impact of a realistic, potential change to
their university commitment.
All participants were presented with the same debriefing screen which detailed the nature
of the study and required that participants type a pre-defined written statement indicating their
understanding of the fictional nature of the proposed changes to degree requirements.
Participants were provided with information for counseling services in the event of need for
additional support, and participants were provided with the opportunity to withdraw their data
from study inclusion following debriefing.

Measures
Participants were asked complete the following measures of anxiety and metacognitions
after reporting their gender, age, race/ethnicity, and current academic year.
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults – Form Y (STAI; Spielberger, 1968). The
STAI is a 40-item self-report measure consisting of two subscales measuring state (STAI-S;
Form Y-1) and trait (STAI-T; Form Y-2) anxiety. Each subscale consists of twenty items which
are rated on a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so) on the
state subscale and from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) on the trait subscale. The state
subscale consists of questions asking participants to rate how they feel in the moment (e.g., “I
feel at ease,” “I feel upset”), while the trait subscale instructs participants to indicate how they
usually feel (e.g., “I lack self-confidence,” “I am a steady person”). As recommended by the
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author (Spielberger, 1983), the STAI-S was administered immediately before administration of
the STAI-T prior to the condition manipulation; the STAI-S was administered again following
exposure. Higher scores on the STAI subscales indicate greater self-reported levels of current
anxiety or anxiety proneness. The STAI subscales have demonstrated good to excellent internal
consistency and acceptable to good test-retest reliability (see Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002 for a
review). In the present study, the STAI demonstrated excellent internal consistency across both
subtests at time one (STAI-S α = 0.97; STAI-T α = 0.96) and time two (STAI-S α = 0.98).
Additionally, the STAI-S demonstrated good test-retest reliability (r(24) = 0.85; p < .001).
Metacognitions Questionnaire – 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
The MCQ-30 is a shortened version of the 65-item Metacognitions Questionnaire which
maintains the original five-factor structure (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), which
measures individual differences in maladaptive positive and negative beliefs about worry, beliefs
about the need to control thoughts, confidence (or lack thereof) in one’s cognitive capabilities,
and attention to one’s own thoughts. The 30-item self-report questionnaire asks participants to
rate relevant statements in each of these domains on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1
(not at all) to 4 (agree very much). Higher scores on the MCQ-30 indicate greater levels of selfreported maladaptive beliefs about one’s thoughts. The five-factor structure of the MCQ-30 has
been demonstrated in a variety of samples (see Grøtte et al., 2016 for a review). Additionally, the
MCQ-30 has evidenced acceptable to excellent internal consistency, strong test-retest
correlations, and convergent validity with the trait subscale of the STAI (Wells & CartwrightHatton, 2004). In the present study, the MCQ-30 demonstrated excellent internal consistency at
time one (α = 0.92) and time two (α = 0.95). Additionally, the MCQ-30 yielded excellent testretest reliability for the total score (r(24) = 0.97; p < 0.001).
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RESULTS

In order to test whether between-group differences existed on measures of state anxiety,
trait anxiety, and metacognitive beliefs prior to exposure, a series of independent t-tests were
conducted. At time one, there were no significant differences between the two groups on state or
trait anxiety or metacognitive beliefs (Table 1). At time two, group differences between state
anxiety and metacognitive beliefs were not significant (Table 2). Because the STAI-S scores at

Table 1: Pre-Exposure Group Differences
Control Group

Experimental Group

Measure

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

t value

p value

Effect size

STAI-Trait

38.50

14.4

42.40

13.8

-0.70

0.48

-0.28

STAI-State

35.64

17.1

40.42

14.2

-0.78

0.49

-0.28

MCQ-30 Total

54.50

14.4

62.42

13.2

-1.45

0.16

-0.57

Table 2: Post-Exposure Group Differences
Control Group

Experimental Group

Measure

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

t value

p value

Effect size

STAI-State

35.00

17.4

48.25

16.9

-1.97

0.061

-0.77

MCQ-30 Total

48.57

16.3

59.75

12.4

-1.94

0.064

-0.76

both times violated the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, a Welch adjustment was utilized in each
independent-samples analysis and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was utilized in each
dependent-samples analysis involving these scores. Accordingly, effect sizes for dependent t11

tests are indicated by the matched rank biserial correlation. For all other analyses, effect sizes are
indicated by Cohen’s d.
A series of paired-samples t-tests were conducted in order to examine within-group
differences between pre-exposure and post-exposure scores on metacognitive beliefs and state
anxiety for those participants in the experimental condition. State anxiety was found to
significantly increase following exposure with a large effect size, while MCQ-30 total scores
significantly decreased with a moderate effect size (Table 3). The MCQ-30 positive and negative
subscale scores did not demonstrate significant change following exposure (Table 3). Similarly, a
series of paired-samples t-tests were conducted to examine within-group differences for those
participants in the control condition. STAI-S scores at time one (M = 35.64, SD = 17.1) were not
significantly different at time two (M = 35.00, SD = 17.4), t(13) = 29.00, p = 0.92. However,
MCQ-30 total scores at time one (M = 54.50, SD = 14.4) significantly decreased following
exposure at time two (M = 48.6, SD = 16.3) with a large effect size, t(13) = 6.01, p < 0.001, d =
1.61.

Table 3: Experimental Group Pre-Post Differences

Pre-Exposure

Post-Exposure

Measure

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

t value

p value

Effect size

MCQ-30 Total

62.42

13.2

59.75

12.4

2.70

0.021

0.78

MCQ-30 Positive

12.92

4.3

13.17

4.1

-0.49

0.63

-0.14

MCQ-30 Negative

12.17

4.9

11.67

4.4

1.20

0.26

0.35

STAI-State

40.42

14.2

48.25

16.9

7.50

0.025

-0.81
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In both the whole sample and the experimental condition, STAI-S change scores were
hypothesized to predict MCQ-30 change scores when controlling for the STAI-T and this
hypothesis called for the use of a regression analysis. However, because there were no significant
correlations between these scores for either group, a regression was not conducted. Descriptive
statistics for these change scores and their correlations with trait anxiety are reported in Table 4
and Table 5.

Table 4: Change Score Descriptive Statistics
Control Group

Experimental Group

Measure

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

STAI-S Change

-0.64

4.8

7.80

11.9

MCQ-30 Total Change

-5.93

3.7

-2.67

3.4

Table 5: Change Scores and Trait Anxiety Correlations
MCQ-30 Total Change
Measure
STAI-S Change
MCQ-30 Total Change

STAI-T Total

Pearson's r

p value

Pearson's r

p value

-0.27

0.398

-0.32

0.319

--

--

0.18

0.584

13

DISCUSSION

The two primary aims of the present study were to (1) pilot a novel, online anxietyinducing narrative and writing exercise aimed at undergraduate students and (2) examine the
changes in state anxiety and metacognitive beliefs as previous research has not explicitly used
the MCQ-30 to explore this relationship.
As hypothesized, there was no evidence of group differences on state anxiety, trait
anxiety, or metacognitive beliefs prior to exposure. While the control group did not report
significant changes in state anxiety, the experimental group reported significantly increased state
anxiety after exposure, supporting our hypothesis. These results suggest the degree requirement
change narrative and writing exercise designed for the purposes of this study were sufficiently
anxiety-inducing and the matched control stimulus was appropriately neutral. However, contrary
to our hypothesis, no significant difference between groups on state anxiety were observed
following exposure. If such a discrepancy had occurred, these results would have provided
increased support for the use of this manipulation as a means of inducing anxiety out of the lab.
Contrary to our hypotheses, following exposure both groups reported significantly
decreased scores on the measure of metacognitive beliefs and there was not a significant
difference between groups on post-metacognition scores. One possible conclusion that may be
drawn from these results is that although the stimulus appeared to effectively increase anxiety,
due to the nature of the worrisome content, positive beliefs about the benefits of worrying were
not activated. Because the possible implementation of the proposed changes to degree
requirements would be beyond the students’ control, perhaps the participants in this condition
did not find utility in worrying about such a possibility. This conclusion is supported by the
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finding that there were no significant changes in the experimental condition on positive beliefs
about worry following exposure, though this finding was also contrary to our hypothesis.
Further, because metacognitive theory suggests positive beliefs about worry ultimately
contribute to increased negative beliefs about worry, negative beliefs were hypothesized to
significantly increase in the experimental condition. This hypothesis was not supported as no
significant change was observed following exposure. Given the lack of significant change in
positive beliefs, this result appears to be consistent with the metacognitive model.
However, the above conclusion does not explain the significant decrease in
metacognition scores in the control condition. An informal a posteriori examination of the
control participants’ ratings of confidence in their ability to complete the existing degree
requirements revealed an average confidence level between “mildly confident” and “somewhat
confident,” with half of the participants indicating they are “very confident.” These results may
suggest that reflecting on one’s perceived ability to succeed can positively influence maladaptive
beliefs about one’s thoughts. On the other hand, previous research has not demonstrated a
significant relationship between self-perception of problem-solving ability and positive beliefs
about worry (Khawaja & Chapman, 2007). As examining the changes in individual MCQ-30
subscale scores within the control was beyond the scope of this study, future research may
benefit from more closely examining these changes and additional factors that may influence
them.
Finally, state anxiety change scores were hypothesized to predict metacognition change
scores when trait anxiety was controlled. However, no significant relationship was observed
between these change scores and trait anxiety. Similarly, there was no significant relationship
between state anxiety change scores and metacognition change scores. This pattern may be due
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to the significant decreases in metacognition scores, particularly in the experimental group.
Because state anxiety significantly increased for this group, had their metacognition scores also
significantly increased, examining the predictive power of the STAI-S on the MCQ-30 may have
been applicable.
Several limitations exist for the present study. The online, self-report nature of the study,
despite the attention check, did not allow for control of distracting elements as participants
completed the survey. The generalizability of these results to a larger population is restricted by
the demographic makeup of the sample. The most significant limitation of this study was the
small sample size, which hindered power to detect differences between groups and draw
meaningful conclusions.
Given the limitations of the present study, future research would advance our
understanding of the relationship between state anxiety and metacognitions by examining the
effects of induced anxiety on a larger, more diverse sample. The efficacy of the induced-anxiety
manipulation implemented in this study would benefit from replication, particularly with a larger
sample. Additionally, increasing the length of the writing exercise or time between evaluating
post-exposure scores may provide more insight into the role of time spent ruminating on these
changes.
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